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How the COVID-19 Pandemic Has and Should 
Reshape the American Safety Net 
Andrew Hammond,† Ariel Jurow Kleiman,†† and Gabriel 
Scheffler††† 
  INTRODUCTION   
The COVID-19 pandemic has delivered an unprecedented shock 
to the United States and the world. It is unclear precisely how long this 
crisis, which is both epidemiological and economic, will last, and it is 
difficult to gauge the extent and direction of the changes in American 
life these crises will cause. Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute that the 
COVID-19 pandemic is putting significant strain on both the ability of 
Americans to meet basic needs and our government’s capacity to as-
sist them. Federal, state, and local governments have responded in 
various ways to deploy existing safety net programs like Medicaid, 
SNAP (food stamps), tax credits, and unemployment insurance to 
meet the surge in need. At this stage of the crisis, it is worth a) identi-
fying the ways in which the pandemic feeds on and exacerbates both 
racial and economic inequality in America, b) analyzing the govern-
ment response in detail, c) considering which changes should outlast 
the current crisis, and d) addressing how government, in the future, 
should build social welfare programs that are better suited to meet 
the needs of all Americans in the coming years. This Essay tries to do 
these four things in a way that is cogent and useful to legal and lay 
audiences alike. 
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The authors are grateful for feedback from Manasi Deshpande, Mirat Eyal-Cohen, 
Sarah Grusin, David Hasen, and participants in the COVID-19: Law, Economics, and 
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  I.  THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC’S INHERENT INEQUALITIES   
The current crisis is two-fold: epidemiological and economic. 
Both crises will have inordinate negative impacts on low-income 
households and communities of color. In this Part, we unpack the pub-
lic health consequences of COVID-19 first. We then lay out the eco-
nomic fallout from the pandemic. 
A. COVID-19 AS AN EPIDEMIOLOGICAL CRISIS 
Although we lack comprehensive data, low-income Americans 
appear both at greater risk of contracting COVID-19 and of suffering 
worse health outcomes as a result of the virus.1 Low-income people 
are at elevated risk of contracting COVID-19 for a number of possible 
reasons. To name a few, they are more likely to live in overcrowded 
housing, to use public transportation, and to work in jobs that require 
in-person interaction.2 In addition, they have higher rates of preexist-
ing conditions like diabetes and chronic obstructive pulmonary disor-
der (COPD),3 which put them at increased risk of complications from 
COVID-19.4 They are also are more likely to be uninsured,5 and in part 
 
 1. See Wyatt Koma, Samantha Artiga, Tricia Neuman, Gary Claxton, Matthew 
Rae, Jennifer Kates, & Josh Michaud, Low-Income and Communities of Color at Higher 
Risk of Serious Illness if Infected with Coronavirus, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (May 2020), 
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/low-income-and 
-communities-of-color-at-higher-risk-of-serious-illness-if-infected-with-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/G7KB-L7DC]; Julia Lynch, Health Equity, Social Policy, and Promot-
ing Recovery from COVID-19, 45 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 983, 984–985 (2020); Max 
Fisher & Emma Bubola, As Coronavirus Deepens Inequality, Inequality Worsens Its 
Spread, N.Y. TIMES (March 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/ 
europe/coronavirus-inequality.html [https://perma.cc/5BYC-L4KJ]. 
 2. See Emily A. Benfer & Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Justice Strategies to Combat 
COVID-19: Protecting Vulnerable Communities During A Pandemic, HEALTH AFF. BLOG 
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200319 
.757883/full/ [https://perma.cc/QEM8-ZFL8]; Rebekah L. Rollston & Sandro Galea, 
The Coronavirus Does Discriminate: How Social Conditions are Shaping the COVID-19 
Pandemic, CTR. FOR PRIMARY CARE, HARVARD MEDICAL SCH. (May 5, 2020), http://info 
.primarycare.hms.harvard.edu/blog/social-conditions-shape-covid [https://perma 
.cc/KE6L-VXDF]. 
 3. Richard V. Reeves & Jonathan Rothwell, Class and COVID: How the Less Affluent 
Face Double Risks, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ 
up-front/2020/03/27/class-and-covid-how-the-less-affluent-face-double-risks/ 
[https://perma.cc/SNF5-9RBN]. 
 4. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, People Who Are at Higher Risk 
for Severe Illness, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra 
-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html [https://perma.cc/P5R8-HDPG]. 
 5. Robin A. Cohen, Emily P. Terlizzi, & Michael E. Martinez, Health Insurance Cov-
erage: Early Release of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, 2018 1, 4 
(May 2019) https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur201905.pdf 
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as a result, they have more limited access to health care.6  
Likewise, although data on racial disparities in COVID-19’s im-
pacts have been limited,7 the existing data suggest that Black and 
Latinx populations in particular are both at greater risk of contracting 
COVID-19 and of suffering serious illness and dying from the virus.8 
 
[https://perma.cc/8F5K-YFSH]. 
 6. Peter J. Cunningham, Why Even Healthy Low-Income People Have Greater 
Health Risks Than Higher-Income People, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2018/healthy-low-income-people 
-greater-health-risks [https://perma.cc/8TCW-GM8S].  
 7. See Brianna Ehley, CDC Head Apologizes for Lack of Racial Disparity Data on 
Coronavirus, POLITICO (Jun. 4, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/04/ 
coronavirus-robert-redfield-racial-disparity-cdc-301223 [https://perma.cc/7SNM 
-TRSE]; Lisa Cooper, State COVID-19 Data by Race, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. CORONAVIRUS 
RESOURCE CTR., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/racial-data-transparency [https:// 
perma.cc/7NUG-5XF2] (“[R]acial and ethnic information is currently available for only 
about 35% of the total deaths in the U.S.”). Data limitations have been especially detri-
mental for Indigenous people, whose data are frequently misclassified or omitted from 
reports to health authorities. See Kate Conger, Robert Gebeloff, & Richard A. Oppel Jr., 
Native Americans Feel Devastated by the Virus Yet Overlooked in the Data, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jul. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/30/us/native-americans 
-coronavirus-data.html [https://perma.cc/LC9M-ZJVJ]; Lizzie Wade, COVID-19 Data 
on Native Americans Is ‘A National Disgrace.’ This Scientist is Fighting to Be Counted, 
SCIENCE (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/09/covid-19 
-data-native-americans-national-disgrace-scientist-fighting-be-counted [https:// 
perma.cc/X48E-Q2PC].  
 8. See, e.g., Eboni G. Price-Haywood, Jeffrey Burton, Daniel Fort, & Leonardo 
Seoane, Hospitalization and Mortality among Black Patients and White Patients with 
Covid-19, 382 N. ENG. J. MED. 2534 (2020) (analyzing data at a Louisiana hospital sys-
tem and finding that Black patients accounted for over 75 percent of those hospitalized 
with COVID-19 and over 70 percent of those who died, even though they comprised 
only 31 percent of the overall patient population); Richard A. Oppel Jr., Robert Gebeloff, 
K.K. Rebecca Lai, Will Wright, & Mitch Smith, The Fullest Look Yet at the Racial Inequity 
of Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/ 
07/05/us/coronavirus-latinos-african-americans-cdc-data.html [https://perma.cc/ 
V3M2-QVVV] (“Latino and African-American residents of the United States have been 
three times as likely to become infected as their white neighbors, . . . [a]nd Black and 
Latino people have been nearly twice as likely to die from the virus as white people, 
the data shows.”); THE COVID TRACKING PROJECT, The COVID Racial Data Tracker, 
https://covidtracking.com/race [https://perma.cc/P9JE-9CVQ] (finding that Black 
Americans are dying at a rate over 2 times higher than their population share); Dylan 
Scott, Covid-19’s Devastating Toll on Black and Latino Americans, in One Chart, VOX (Apr. 
17, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/17/21225610/us-coronavirus-death-rates 
-blacks-latinos-whites [https://perma.cc/R4B7-J7S7] (“Black and Latino Americans 
get infected with Covid-19 at alarmingly high rates and more are dying than we would 
expect based on their share of the population.”). The available data also suggest that 
COVID-19 has disproportionately affected Indigenous communities in the United 
States, though data limitations have prevented understanding the full extent of these 
effects. See Sarah Hatcher et al., COVID-19 Among American Indian and Alaska Native 
Persons – 23 States, January 31 – July 3, 2020, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
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Again, there are a number of possible reasons for these disparities: 
Black and Latinx workers are overrepresented in many frontline oc-
cupations that put them at higher risk of contracting the virus,9 and 
they are less likely to be able to telework.10 Because of housing segre-
gation, they are more likely to live in densely populated areas where 
it is harder to maintain social distancing11 and to face exposure to air 
pollution—which in turn has been linked to higher mortality rates 
from COVID-19.12 Black Americans in particular are also more likely 
to suffer from comorbidities like asthma,13 heart disease,14 and diabe-
tes,15 which put them at higher risk of severe illness from COVID-19,16 
 
PREVENTION (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm 
6934e1.htm [https://perma.cc/C6SK-T6ZP]; Wade, supra note 7. 
 9. Hye Jin Rho, Hayley Brown, & Shawn Fremstad, A Basic Demographic Profile 
of Workers in Frontline Industries, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POL’Y RES. (Apr. 2020), https:// 
cepr.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2020-04-Frontline-Workers.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/SKK9-VC7J].  
 10. Elise Gould & Heidi Shierholz, Black and Hispanic Workers Are Much Less 
Likely To Be Able To Telework, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 2020), https://www.epi.org/ 
blog/black-and-hispanic-workers-are-much-less-likely-to-be-able-to-work-from 
-home/ [https://perma.cc/JA4T-SR59].  
 11. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, COVID-19 in Racial and Ethnic 
Minority Groups, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra 
-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities.html [https://perma.cc/3G7U-ZR5J].  
 12. See Xiao Wu, Rachel C. Nethery, Benjamin M. Sabath, Danielle Braun, & Fran-
cesca Dominici, Exposure to Air Pollution and COVID-19 Mortality in the United States: 
A Nationwide Cross-Sectional Study, MEDRXIV (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.medrxiv 
.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.05.20054502v2 [https://perma.cc/HRB9-6TAY]. See 
also Zinzi D. Bailey, Nancy Krieger, Madina Agénor, Jasmine Graves, Natalia Linos, & 
Mary T. Bassett, Structural racism and health inequities in the USA: evidence and inter-
ventions, 389 THE LANCET 1453, 1456–57 (2017) (documenting adverse health out-
comes associated with residential segregation); Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, 
Law, Structural Racism and the COVID-19 Pandemic, 7 J. L. & BIOS. 7–10 (2020) (describ-
ing how structural racism in housing has contributed to racial disparities in COVID-19 
susceptibility). 
 13. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Most Recent National Asthma 
Data, https://www.cdc.gov/asthma/most_recent_national_asthma_data.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/T6FA-G5SC].  
 14. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, A Closer Look at African Ameri-
can Men and High Blood Pressure Control 1, 8 (2010) https://www.cdc.gov/bloodpres-
sure/docs/African_American_Executive_Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X36 
-TCAS].  
 15. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, National Diabetes Statistics Re-
port 2020: Estimates of Diabetes and its Burden in the United States 1, 2 (2020) 
https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/national-diabetes-statistics 
-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/MST2-7CMW].  
 16. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Coronavirus Disease 2019 
(COVID-19): People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness (May 14, 2020), https:// 
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher 
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and their symptoms may be further exacerbated by the physiological 
stresses caused by racism and discrimination.17 Finally, Black and 
Latinx Americans are less likely to have health insurance,18 and more 
likely to suffer discriminatory treatment in medical settings,19 both of 
which may cause them to delay or avoid seeking treatment, further 
compounding health inequities.20  
B. COVID-19 AS AN ECONOMIC CRISIS 
The same inequalities that exacerbate COVID-19 as a disease 
among marginalized communities also exacerbate economic harms 
from the COVID-triggered recession. The relationship between our 
country’s deep and persistent inequality and COVID-19 as an eco-
nomic shock will not be fully appreciated for years to come, but we 
can readily identify two dimensions of inequality in the U.S. that are 
fueling COVID-19 as an economic crisis. 
The first is the nature of work in America. The United States 
 
-risk.html [https://perma.cc/CLA2-T7DZ].  
 17. See Linda Villarosa, ‘A Terrible Price’: The Deadly Racial Disparities of Covid-19 
in America, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/ 
magazine/racial-disparities-covid-19.html [https://perma.cc/KP7K-2484].  
 18. Cohen, Terlizzi & Martinez, supra note 5, at 4.  
 19. See generally DAYNA BOWEN MATTHEW, JUST MEDICINE: A CURE FOR RACIAL 
INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (2015); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL 
ACADEMIES, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH 
CARE 77 (Brian D. Smedley, Adrienne Y. Stith, & Alan R. Nelson eds. 2003) (reviewing 
the literature on racial disparities in health care and finding that “[r]acial and ethnic 
minority patients are found to receive a lower quality and intensity of healthcare and 
diagnostic services across a wide range of procedures and disease areas.”). See also 
Austin Frakt, Race and Medicine: The Harm That Comes from Mistrust, N.Y. TIMES UPSHOT 
(Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/13/upshot/race-and-medicine 
-the-harm-that-comes-from-mistrust.html [https://perma.cc/BT6T-6F3B] (“Put 
simply, people of color receive less care — and often worse care — than white Ameri-
cans.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Marcella Alsan & Marianne Wanamaker, Tuskegee and the Health of 
Black Men, 133 Q. J. ECON. 407 (2018) (finding that the disclosure of the Tuskegee Study 
in 1972 was linked to increases in mistrust of the medical profession, decreases in phy-
sician interactions, and reduced life expectancy for Black men); Rachel Garfield, Kendal 
Orgera, & Anthony Damico, The Uninsured and the ACA: A Primer – Key Facts about 
Health Insurance and the Uninsured amidst Changes to the Affordable Care Act, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (Jan 25, 2019), https://www.kff.org/report-section/the-uninsured-and 
-the-aca-a-primer-key-facts-about-health-insurance-and-the-uninsured-amidst 
-changes-to-the-affordable-care-act-how-does-lack-of-insurance-affect-access-to 
-care/ [https://perma.cc/U9Q6-PYUM] (“Uninsured people are far more likely than 
those with insurance to postpone health care or forgo it altogether. The consequences 
can be severe, particularly when preventable conditions or chronic diseases go unde-
tected.”). 
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economy is very good at creating very bad jobs. One study conducted 
a few months before the pandemic found that 53 million American 
workers between ages 18 to 64—44 percent of all workers—earn 
subsistence wages.21 Their median earnings were just over $10 per 
hour, or about $20,000 per year. These workers also lack job benefits 
like paid sick and family leave or health insurance that help individu-
als and households navigate economic shocks.22 This type of low-wage 
work in the US leaves workers at constant risk of financial calamity. 
The combination of low pay and no health insurance means that 
health costs can be financially ruinous.23 And most of these Americans 
are considered at-will employees so if they or their loved ones get sick, 
they can be fired.24 
Moreover, these low-wage workers are concentrated in indus-
tries like retail, food service, janitorial, and care work—all of which 
have been particularly vulnerable to the shutdowns and other eco-
nomic impacts of the COVID-19 crisis. Of the industries where these 
workers are concentrated, only administrative jobs have the potential 
to be done from home.25 While some of these industries could rebound 
in the coming months or years, it appears more likely than not that the 
service industry will continue to see less demand because of social 
 
 21. See Martha Ross & Nicole Bateman, Meet The Low-Wage Workforce, BROOKINGS 
INST. (Nov. 7, 2019), https://brook.gs/2NIeQtN [https://perma.cc/36WG-3HNB]. 
 22. See Kathryn Dill, Lack of Sick Time Worries Workers as Coronavirus Looms, 
WALL ST. J. (March 11, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lack-of-sick-time-wor-
ries-workers-as-coronavirus-looms-11583938713 [https://perma.cc/446F-RJPR]. 
 23. See Allison K. Hoffman, The Threat of Coronavirus Medical Bankruptcy, THE 
HILL (Apr. 1, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/490168-the-threat-of 
-coronavirus-medical-bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/G2DB-5FGD]. 
 24. See Marshall H. Tanick, COVID-19 Highlights Need for Greater Job Protection, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB. (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/covid-19 
-highlights-need-for-greater-job-protection/569741532/ [https://perma.cc/6PD5 
-8GPP]. 
 25. See Neeta P. Fogg & Paul E. Harrington, COVID-19 Shutdowns Are Hitting Low-
Income Workers Especially Hard, NEW ENG. BD. OF HIGHER ED. (May 18, 2020), https:// 
nebhe.org/journal/covid-19-shutdowns-are-hitting-low-income-workers-especially 
-hard/ [https://perma.cc/JH3X-A54N] (finding that, in the New England region, eight 
of ten jobs lost between mid-March and mid-April were in industries characterized by 
below-average skill requirements and wages); Matthew Dey & Mark A. Loewenstein, 
How Many Workers Are Employed In Sectors Directly Affected By COVID-19 Shutdowns, 
Where do They Work, and How Much do They Earn?, MONTHLY LAB. REV., U.S. BUR. OF LAB. 
STAT. (Apr. 2020), https://doi.org/10.21916/mlr.2020.6 [https://perma.cc/MLW8 
-ML4Q]; Eric Morath & Rachel Feintzeig, ‘I Have Bills I Have to Pay.’ Low-Wage Workers 




160 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [105:154 
 
distancing measures and the deepening economic crisis.26 And Black 
and Latinx workers are disproportionately disadvantaged during this 
economic downturn as they are concentrated in the hardest-hit sec-
tors, are paid less, have fewer financial assets, and are less likely than 
white workers to be free to work remotely.27 
The second is the fractured and inequitable distribution of gov-
ernment support.28 Although Congress initially acted quickly to pro-
vide pandemic-related assistance, it did so through existing transfer 
programs. As a result, those who are intentionally excluded from 
safety net programs during normal times, such as childless house-
holds, jobless individuals, and immigrants, have been difficult to 
reach.29 Moreover, rampant worker misclassification in many low-
wage industries, as well as growth of the “gig economy,” means that 
many workers will not receive support provided only to employees, 
 
 26. See Rakesh Kochhar & Amanda Barroso, Young Workers Likely to be Hard Hit 
as COVID-19 Strikes a Blow to Restaurants and Other Service Sector Jobs, PEW RES. CTR. 
(March 27, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/03/27/young 
-workers-likely-to-be-hard-hit-as-covid-19-strikes-a-blow-to-restaurants-and-other 
-service-sector-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/7GZ9-5SJA]. 
 27. See Michael Karpman, Stephen Zuckerman, Dulce Gonzalez, & Genevieve M. 
Kenney, The COVID-19 Pandemic Is Straining Families’ Abilities to Afford Basic Needs, 
URBAN INST. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/covid-19 
-pandemic-straining-families-abilities-afford-basic-needs [https://perma.cc/9R66 
-2M5C]; see also Elise Gould, Daniel Perez, & Valerie Wilson, Latinx Workers—Particu-
larly Women—Face Devastating Job Losses in the COVID-19 Recession, ECON. POL’Y INST. 
(Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/latinx-workers-covid/ [https:// 
perma.cc/A7A2-C8PJ]; Elise Gould & Valerie Wilson, Black Workers Face Two of the 
Most Lethal Preexisting Conditions for Coronavirus—Racism and Economic Inequality, 
ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 1, 2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/black-workers 
-covid/ [https://perma.cc/4TN6-CN5S]; Jeanna Smialek & Jim Tankersley, Black 
Workers, Already Lagging, Face Big Economic Risks, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/business/economy/black-workers 
-inequality-economic-risks.html [https://perma.cc/CPH6-E4C9]. 
 28. See David Super, The Crisis is Exposing the Harm Structural Attacks on Anti-
Poverty Programs Have Done, BALKINIZATION (May 23, 2020), https://balkin 
.blogspot.com/2020/05/the-crisis-is-exposing-harm-structural.html?m=0&version= 
meter+at+null [https://perma.cc/N4PT-HMGX]. 
 29. Id. (making this point); Margot L. Crandall-Hollick, COVID-19 and Direct Pay-
ments to Individuals: Summary of the 2020 Recovery Rebates/Economic Impact Pay-
ments in the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136), CONG. RES. SERV., (Apr. 17, 2020), https:// 
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11282 [https://perma.cc/QD6Q-DKG3] 
(explaining that “many low-income individuals and families, including workers with-
out children who do not receive benefits like the EITC or child credit, may not have 
filed a 2018 or 2019 income tax return” and as such “would not receive these rebates 
in 2020, unless they manually provided information to the IRS via their nonfiler por-
tal . . . .”). 
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such as paid leave.30 Lastly, some households are intentionally ex-
cluded from COVID-19-related benefits, including undocumented in-
dividuals and their U.S. citizen or legal resident family members.31 The 
Migration Policy Institute estimates that this exclusion resulted in the 
denial of cash stimulus payments to 5.5 million U.S. citizens and legal 
permanent residents because their tax returns included someone who 
lacks a social security number.32 
Even those eligible for pandemic-related benefits have been 
thwarted by program complexity and technology problems.33 Accord-
ing to the Economic Policy Institute, for every ten successful recipients 
of pandemic-related unemployment benefits, an additional two appli-
cants gave up because the application process was too onerous, and 
three to four could not finish the process due to technology prob-
lems.34 Given the direct relationship between technological and eco-
nomic inequality,35 these barriers affect the neediest applicants the 
most. 
 
 30. Alex Rosenblat, Gig Workers Are Here to Stay. It’s Time to Give Them Benefits, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 03, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/07/gig-workers-are-here-to 
-stay-its-time-to-give-them-benefits [https://perma.cc/WJ43-CGWP]. 
 31. See Muzaffar Chishti & Jessica Bolter, Vulnerable to COVID-19 and in Frontline 
Jobs, Immigrants Are Mostly Shut Out of U.S. Relief, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 24, 
2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/print/16745#.XuFpA55KgUs [https:// 
perma.cc/N2TY-74HR]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Renu Zaretsky, CARES Act Support is Falling Short, TAXVOX (May 6, 2020), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/cares-act-support-falling-short#:~:text= 
The%20CARES%20Act%20expanded%20eligibility,unemployment%20benefits%20
by%2013%20weeks [https://perma.cc/XY3A-2VMP] (detailing problems with com-
plexity and technological failures plaguing CARES Act benefits); Scott Roybal & Jen-
nifer N. Le, The CARES Act – Who’s Minding the Store, SHEPPARD MULLIN GOV’T CONTRACTS 
& INVESTIGATIONS BLOG (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.governmentcontractslawblog 
.com/2020/04/articles/government-contracts-law/cares-act-minding-the-store/ 
[https://perma.cc/G9RU-ZRF9 ] (detailing myriad oversight and reporting pitfalls that 
make compliance with CARES Act rules difficult for business owners). 
 34. Ben Zipperer & Elise Gould, Unemployment Filing Failures: New Survey Con-
firms that Millions of Jobless Were Unable to File an Unemployment Insurance Claim, 
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.epi.org/blog/unemployment-filing 
-failures-new-survey-confirms-that-millions-of-jobless-were-unable-to-file-an 
-unemployment-insurance-claim/ [https://perma.cc/89HW-2FG3]; see also Heather 
Long, Jeff Stein, Lisa Rein, & Tony Romm, Stimulus Checks and Other Coronavirus Relief 
Hindered by Date Technology and Rocky Government Rollout, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/17/stimulus 
-unemployment-checks-delays-government-delays/ [https://perma.cc/FL7D-T476]. 
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Importantly, and as we discuss at the end of the Essay, systemic 
racism built into the design of government programs means that gaps 
in benefit distribution will track existing racial fault lines. As one ex-
ample, longstanding and well-documented racial inequities in access 
to lending means that businesses owned by Black and Latinx entre-
preneurs have been far less likely to receive pandemic-related small 
business support.36 Congress’s inability or refusal to pass an addi-
tional stimulus in the fall of 2020 has worked to similar effect, both 
ignoring and exacerbating the racially disparate impact of the pan-
demic. While the overall unemployment rate in the third quarter of 
2020 dropped to single digits—from a high of nearly 15 percent in 
May37—the unemployment rate among Black and Latinx workers re-
mained in the double digits, at 13.2 percent and 11.2 percent respec-
tively.38 In October 2020, researchers estimated that the number of 
poor people had grown by 8 million since May 2020, with especially 
severe increases for Black and Latinx individuals.39 The lack of ur-
gency among policymakers to support struggling workers and fami-
lies, many of whom are nonwhite, thus reflects a blindness to the par-
ticular harm that these crises have wrought on Black and Latinx 
people. 
The twin crises of the pandemic and recession will affect every-
one worldwide, but none as catastrophically as the poor. The inade-
quacy of our band-aid responses to these longstanding social fissures 
are now laid bare. However, more than merely holding a magnifying 
 
 36. Claire Kramer Mills & Jessica Battisto, Double Jeopardy: Covid-19’s Concen-
trated Health and Wealth Effects in Black Communities, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW 
YORK, 4–6 (2020), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/ 
smallbusiness/DoubleJeopardy_COVID19andBlackOwnedBusinesses [https://perma 
.cc/37DJ-4MB7]. 
 37. U.S. Bur. Labor Stat., Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, 
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?bls [https://perma.cc/3LN7-WV7M] (select 
“Unemployment Rate (Seasonally Adjusted) - LNS14000000,” choose “retrieve data,” 
then select time range 2010 to 2020). 
 38. U.S. Bur. Labor Stat., E-16. Unemployment Rates by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic 
or Latino Ethnicity (Oct. 5 2020), https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpsee_e16.htm 
[https://perma.cc/MT6E-HQRE]. 
 39. See Jason DeParle, 8 Million Have Slipped into Poverty Since May as Federal Aid 
Has Dried Up, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/15/ 
us/politics/federal-aid-poverty-levels.html [https://perma.cc/YY2Q-5VCK] (citing 
Zachary Parolin, Megan Curran, Jordan Matsudaira, Jane Waldfogel, & Christopher 
Wimer, Monthly Poverty Rates in the United States During the COVID-19 Pandemic, (Pov-
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glass to our collective failures, these crises present an opportunity for 
meaningful change. The next Part describes policymakers’ early re-
forms to safety net programs, which aimed to address these crises 
among struggling U.S. households. 
  II.  THE INITIAL RESPONSE: THE U.S. SAFETY NET AS A SHORT-
TERM FIX   
To date, Congress passed and President Trump signed four major 
pieces of legislation to address the COVID-19 crisis. The first, the Coro-
navirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, enacted on March 6, 2020, provided $8.3 billion in funding for fed-
eral agencies to respond to the outbreak of the virus in the U.S. and 
abroad.40 The second, the Families First Coronavirus Response (Fam-
ilies First) Act, signed into law on March 18, 2020, focused on both the 
epidemiological and economic crises discussed in Part I.41 This legis-
lation included additional funding for food assistance.42 Nine days 
later, on March 27, the President signed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, 
and Economic Security (CARES) Act, a $2 trillion stimulus bill aimed 
at COVID-19 and the attendant economic crisis.43 Then on April 24, the 
President signed the Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care 
Enhancement Act into law, which provided additional funding for pro-
grams under the CARES Act.44 These laws contain numerous provi-
sions that alter safety net programs, such as cash assistance, including 
through the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); near-cash assistance, in-
cluding SNAP (food stamps); medical assistance, including Medicaid; 
and job-related assistance, including state unemployment insurance 
(UI) and federal workforce incentive programs.45 In this Part, we 
 
 40. The Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, Pub. L. 116-123. 
 41. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. 116-127. 
 42. Id.; see also Kellie Moss, The Families First Coronavirus Response Act: Summary 
of Key Provisions, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (March 23, 2020), https://www.kff.org/ 
coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/the-families-first-coronavirus-response-act 
-summary-of-key-provisions/ [https://perma.cc/4FKQ-VLDG]. 
 43. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. 116-138 
[hereinafter CARES Act]. 
 44. Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act, Pub. L. 116-
139. 
 45. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. 116-127; CARES Act, 
Pub. L. 116-138; see also Marianne Bitler, Hilary W. Hoynes, & Diane Whitmore Schan-
zenbach, The Social Safety Net in the Wake of COVID-19 (NBER Working Paper No. 
27796) (discussing the government response and suggesting that the timing, magni-
tude, and coverage of the policy responses explain, in part, why there is still so much 
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relate each change in turn and briefly address how some of these ef-
forts have fallen short, particularly for the most vulnerable groups. 
A. CASH AND NEAR-CASH ASSISTANCE  
The United States distributes direct assistance through various 
programs including refundable tax credits, food assistance, and 
through social insurance policies like the Social Security old-age and 
disability programs. Congress used the existing infrastructure of the 
IRS’s tax credits and SNAP (food stamps) to deliver additional assis-
tance during the pandemic. 
1.  IRS  
As is often true during national crises, the IRS bears much of the 
responsibility for shoring up the economy during the current crisis. In 
this case, pursuant to the CARES Act, the agency has been responsible 
for sending “recovery rebate” checks to millions of American house-
holds.46 The CARES Act provides $1,200 to each adult and $500 to each 
child, which begins to phase out for income above $75,000 for individ-
uals ($150,000 for married couples).47  
Although this individual payment may seem relatively generous, 
it is worth noting that another tax benefit in the CARES Act is esti-
mated to provide an average benefit of $1.6 million each to certain tax-
payers with income over $1 million.48 The provision allows wealthy 
taxpayers to deduct unlimited losses arising from pass-through busi-
nesses, enabling them to reduce or even eliminate their other taxable 
income.49 While the provision may seem to be a worthwhile effort to 
protect taxpayers who suffer business losses as a result of COVID-19, 
taxpayers can also retroactively claim losses incurred in 2018 and 
2019, before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and recession.50 In 
total, this tax benefit is projected to cost over $70 billion in lost tax 
 
need despite the robust policy response). 
 46. I.R.C. § 6428 (West 2020) (providing for a refundable tax credit of $1,200 per 
individual and $500 per child, to phase out beginning at $150,000 gross income for 
joint returns, $75,000 for individuals); CARES Act, H.R. 748, 116th Congress § 2201 
(2020) (enacted). 
 47. I.R.C. § 6428(c) (West 2020). 
 48. See Clint Wallace, The Troubling Case of the Unlimited Pass-Through Deduc-
tion: Section 2304 of the CARES Act, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (2020), https://lawreview-
blog.uchicago.edu/2020/06/29/cares-2304-wallace/ [https://perma.cc/Y78T 
-KSL3]. 
 49. CARES Act, § 2304; Wallace, supra note 48. 
 50. Id.; I.R.C. § 6511(a) (allowing taxpayers to file a refund claim for up to three 
years prior). 
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revenue in 2020.51 
Although nominally structured as a tax credit, the recovery re-
bate is fully refundable, which means that even those without taxable 
income can receive the stimulus payment.52 In order to authorize the 
IRS to send the credit to taxpayers in advance of their 2020 tax returns 
(which will not be filed until 2021), the advance credit amount is cal-
culated based on taxpayers’ 2019 income.53 However, for low-income 
taxpayers with income well below the phase-out thresholds, the year 
used will not matter. That is, all low-income individuals are eligible for 
the full credit amount, provided that they and their family members 
have work-eligible social security numbers. Importantly, even those 
who owe back taxes should receive the full amount, as the rebate 
credit cannot be diverted to satisfy outstanding tax liabilities or other 
federal or state debts, aside from child support offsets.54 
Distribution problems plagued the rollout of these payments. Six 
months after passage of the CARES Act, approximately 9 million peo-
ple still had not received their stimulus payments because the IRS 
lacked their contact information.55 This group is largely composed of 
people who do not normally file a tax return because their income is 
below the filing threshold, a group that includes low-income families 
with children, the long-term unemployed, and childless adults.56 Many 
who received the payments on preloaded debit cards discarded the 
unmarked envelopes the cards arrived in because they had not re-
ceived prior notice to expect the payment.57 Meanwhile, billions of 
dollars of stimulus payments were erroneously sent to ineligible 
 
 51. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-11-20, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN AN AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO 
H.R. 748, THE “CORONAVIRUS AID, RELIEF, AND ECONOMIC SECURITY (‘CARES’) ACT,” AS 
PASSED BY THE SENATE ON MARCH 25, 2020, AND SCHEDULED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON MARCH 27, 2020 (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.jct 
.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5252 [https://perma.cc/Y32G-CQ5S]. 
 52. I.R.C. § 6428(f) (West 2020). 
 53. Id. 
 54. CARES Act, § 2201(d). 
 55. Michelle Singletary, IRS Is Trying to Reach 9 Million People Who Haven’t Col-
lected Their Stimulus Payments, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2020), washingtonpost.com/ 
business/2020/09/11/irs-stimulus-check-letter/ [https://perma.cc/D7SJ-H8KS]. 
 56. Id.; CHUCK MARR, KRIS COX, KATHLEEN BRYANT, STACY DEAN, ROXY CAINES, & ARLOC 
SHERMAN, CTR ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, AGGRESSIVE STATE OUTREACH CAN HELP 
REACH THE 12 MILLION NON-FILERS ELIGIBLE FOR STIMULUS PAYMENTS 1 (Oct. 14, 2020), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/6-11-20tax.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/RZ9L-UM7N]. 
 57. Singletary, supra note 55. 
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foreign workers as well as deceased individuals.58 
In addition to the various stimulus bills passed by Congress, the 
Trump Administration took unilateral action in an attempt to inject 
cash into the economy. On August 8, 2020, the White House issued a 
memorandum directing the Treasury to allow deferred withholding 
and payment of payroll taxes for workers earning less than $4,000 per 
bi-weekly pay period.59 The deferral period runs from September 1 
through December 31, 2020. However, the taxes were only deferred, 
not forgiven, meaning that employers and workers who take ad-
vantage of the policy would owe all unpaid taxes at the end of the 
year.60 Employers could also face liability for taxes they fail to with-
hold, making the deferral particularly unattractive for them.61 Fur-
ther, even if Congress ultimately voted to forgive the unpaid taxes—
the odds of which seem slim in the current climate—the relief would 
only benefit employed workers, ignoring unemployed individuals. 
2.  Food Assistance  
Since the COVID-19 pandemic struck the U.S., rates of household 
food insecurity have doubled and rates of childhood food insecurity 
have tripled.62 In the Families First Act, Congress authorized the De-
partment of Agriculture to allow states to create a “Pandemic EBT” 
program.63 Pandemic EBT is an electronic food assistance benefit for 
 
 58. Sacha Pfeiffer, Foreign Workers Living Overseas Mistakenly Received $1, 200 
U.S. Stimulus Checks, NPR (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/05/ 
898903600/foreign-workers-living-overseas-mistakenly-received-1-200-u-s 
-stimulus-checks [https://perma.cc/Q2UZ-QRPN]; Lorie Konish, About $1.4 Billion in 
Stimulus Checks Sent to Deceased Americans, CNBC (Jun. 25, 2020), https://www.cnbc 
.com/2020/06/25/1point4-billion-in-stimulus-checks-sent-to-deceased-individuals 
.html [https://perma.cc/ULB2-NG8P]. 




 60. Andy Grewal, The Payroll Tax Relief Program Won’t Work, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE 
& COMMENT (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-payroll-tax-relief 
-program-wont-work/ [https://perma.cc/Q95H-T8P5]. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Diane Schanzenbach & Abigail Pitts, How Much Has Food Insecurity Risen? Ev-
idence from the Census Household Pulse Survey, NW. UNIV. INST. FOR POL’Y RES. (June 10, 
2020), https://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/documents/reports/ipr-rapid-research 
-reports-pulse-hh-data-10-june-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R5S-XAB5]; Lauren 
Bauer, The COVID-19 Crisis Has Already Left Too Many Children Hungry in America, 
BROOKINGS INST. THE HAMILTON PROJ. (May 6, 2020).  
 63. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act § 1101(b)-(i). By late August, 
the United States Department of Agriculture had approved Pandemic EBT programs in 
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children who would miss out on free or reduced-price meals at 
school.64 The Families First Act also made emergency appropriations 
to the WIC nutritional program for pregnant women and young chil-
dren and to TEFAP, one of the commodity food programs.65 In addition 
to allowing states to make “emergency allotments” for SNAP house-
holds, Congress also included in the Families First Act an additional 
$100 million in nutrition assistance for the three territories that fed-
eral law excludes from SNAP: the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands (CNMI), Puerto Rico, and American Samoa.66  
The CARES Act not only expanded federal funding of SNAP assis-
tance by over $16 billion,67 it also blocked ongoing efforts by the 
Trump Administration to restrict access to food assistance.68 The key 
 
all fifty states, D.C., and the U.S. Virgin Islands. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
USDA Approves Program to Feed Kids in Idaho: Pandemic EBT now available in all 50 
states (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.fns.usda.gov/news-item/usda-032920 [https:// 
perma.cc/LCD3-4FP6]. There are reports of a failure to deliver these benefits to fami-
lies because of administrative errors at the state level. See, e.g., Natalie Allison, Tennes-
see Could Forfeit $60M in Federal Food Aid for Low-Income Families During Coronavirus 
Pandemic, NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN (July 30, 2020), https://www.tennessean.com/ 
story/news/politics/2020/07/30/tennessee-may-forfeit-60-m-pandemic-ebt-funds 
-applications-stall/5535427002/ [https://perma.cc/B48E-KMEW]. 
 64. State Guidance on Coronavirus Pandemic EBT (P-EBT), FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV. 
(June 2, 2020), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/ 
SNAP-CN-COVID-PEBTGuidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM5Y-DUUX] (explaining that 
the “household allotment amount will be no less than the value of school meals at the 
free rate over the course of five (5) school days for each eligible child in the house-
hold.”). 
 65. Families First Act, Title I (authorizing $500 million for WIC and $400 million 
for TEFAP through September 30, 2021). 
 66. Families First Act, §§ 1102, 2302(a)(1). These three territories normally re-
ceive a block grant of funding as opposed to the entitlement funding enjoyed by the 
rest of the United States. See Andrew Hammond, Territorial Exceptionalism and the 
American Welfare State, 119 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (discussing the exclusion 
of these territories from safety net programs including SNAP). 
 67. House Comm. on Appropriations, Rpt. 116-446 at 73 (116th Cong. 2020), 
https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt446/CRPT-116hrpt446.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/U2EL-2HGY]. 
 68. In addition to the Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependent time limit discussed 
below, the Trump Administration has proposed, but not finalized two other rules that 
would reduce or eliminate benefits for millions of SNAP recipients. The Trump Admin-
istration has proposed revising “broad-based categorical eligibility” (BBCE), which al-
lows states to make low-income families automatically eligible for SNAP benefits if 
they have already qualified to receive certain other types of public assistance. See Re-
vision of Category Eligibility in the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program, 84 
Fed. Reg. 142,35570 (July 24, 2019) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 273). The Trump Ad-
ministration’s proposed rule would remove more than 3 million Americans from 
SNAP. See Dottie Rosenbaum, SNAP’s “Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility” Supports 
Working Families and Those Saving for the Future, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 
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legislative pause on the Administration’s efforts involves a time limit 
for over a million SNAP recipients.69 Since the Welfare Reform Act of 
1996, SNAP includes a time limit for those recipients who are consid-
ered Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs) within the 
meaning of the Food Stamp Act.70 ABAWDs currently can only receive 
three months of SNAP benefits in a three-year period unless they meet 
a work requirement or are exempted from that work requirement.71 
States, however, can apply to the federal government for a waiver if 
the state’s unemployment rate is above the national unemployment 
rate.72 The U.S. Department of Agriculture promulgated a rule that 
would limit the extent to which states can waive a statutory provision 
that places a time limit on ABAWDs’ receipt of SNAP benefits.73 The 
Department of Agriculture estimated that over one million SNAP re-
cipients would be impacted, and one estimate suggests over 750,000 
Americans would lose their SNAP benefits under the proposed rule.74 
 
(July 30, 2010), https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snaps-broad-based 
-categorical-eligibility-supports-working-families-and [https://perma.cc/5V8H 
-R2JU]. The other proposed rule would impact how states account for the costs of util-
ities, including home heating and cooling, in determining SNAP benefits. See Supp. Nu-
tri. Assistance Prog.: Standardization of State Heating and Cooling Standard Utility Al-
lowances, 84 Fed. Reg. 192,52809 (Oct. 3, 2019). The change will result in 19 percent 
of SNAP households receiving lower SNAP monthly benefits. Id. at App’x: Regulatory 
Impact Analysis Supplement to Standardization of State Heating and Cooling Standard 
Utility Allowances 29. 
 69. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act, § 2301(a). 
 70. ABAWDs are defined as recipients ages eighteen to forty-nine who do not 
have a disability or are not caring for children or other dependents in their own home. 
7 C.F.R. § 273.24(c).  
 71. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o); 7 C.F.R. § 273.24(b) (2019) See also Andrew Hammond, 
Litigating Welfare Rights: Medicaid, SNAP, and the Legacy of the New Property, 115 NW. 
U. L. REV. 361 (2020) (discussing the failed efforts to include such a policy in the 2018 
Farm Bill and the subsequent regulatory strategy). 
 72. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(4)(A) (allowing states to seek a waiver to suspend the 
ABAWD time limit for “any group of individuals in the State” if the requested waiver 
area “has an unemployment rate of over 10 percent” or “does not have a sufficient 
number of jobs to provide employment for the individuals.”). 
 73. Food & Nutrit. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Final Rule for Supp. Nutri. Assistance 
Prog.: Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 66782, 
66802 (Dec. 5, 2019). 
 74. See Danielle Paquette & Jeff Stein, Trump Administration Aims to Toughen 
Work Requirements for Food Stamp Recipients, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2018), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-administration-aims-to 
-toughen-work-requirements-for-food-stamps-recipients/2018/12/20/cf687136 
-03e6-11e9-b6a9-0aa5c2fcc9e4_story.html [https://perma.cc/FC53-GDHZ]; Lauren 
Bauer, Workers Could Lose SNAP Benefits Under Trump’s Proposed Rule, BROOKINGS 
INSTIT. (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/12/20/ 
workers-could-lose-snap-benefits-under-trumps-proposed-rule/ [https://perma.cc/ 
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However, before the rule could go into effect as planned last April, a 
federal court preliminarily enjoined the Department of Agriculture 
from implementing it nationwide. In the Families First Act, Congress 
blocked all SNAP work requirements beginning in April 2020 contin-
uing until a month after the COVID-19 public health emergency decla-
ration is lifted.75 Meanwhile, the Trump Administration filed its notice 
of appeal for the federal district court’s injunction to the D.C. Circuit.76 
B.  MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 
Policymakers and private actors have taken several steps to ad-
dress the costs to patients for COVID-19 testing, whereas measures to 
cover the costs to patients of COVID-19 medical care have been more 
piecemeal. Policymakers have also provided financial support for 
health care providers and states struggling with the cost of medical 
care, though the distribution of support has been widely criticized as 
poorly targeted and inequitable.77  
1.  Patients 
The Families First Act requires most private health plans, Medi-
care, and Medicaid to cover FDA-approved testing for COVID-19, as 
well as most out-of-pocket costs associated with the tests, for as long 
as there is a declared public health emergency.78 The law also author-
izes full federal funding for states that use their Medicaid program to 
cover the cost of testing for uninsured people during this period, and 
authorizes $1 billion for the National Disaster Medical System to pay 
for COVID-19 testing for the uninsured population.79 The subse-
quently-passed CARES Act expands the testing coverage provisions 
beyond FDA-approved testing, includes a narrow measure to try to in-
sulate patients from surprise bills for COVID-19 testing80 and provides 
 
EW8D-E3P5] (drawing on research to conclude that “strict enforcement of work re-
quirements will sanction not only those who are able to work but are choosing not to, 
but those who are unable to work and those who are unable to find work or prove that 
they have met the requirement.”). 
 75. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, § 2301(a). 
 76. D.C. et. al. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 20-cv-119 (notice of appeal to D.C. Cir. filed 
by Sec’y Perdue, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.) (D.D.C. May 12, 2020). 
 77. See infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
 78. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, §§ 6001–6004. 
 79. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, § 6004, Title V. 
 80. CARES Act, § 3202. But see Katie Keith, COVID-19 Package #3: The Coverage 
Provisions, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (March 21, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/ 
10.1377/hblog20200320.739699/full/ [https://perma.cc/25P9-VRX9] (discussing 
the limitations of this provision). 
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that a COVID-19 vaccine (once developed) would be covered without 
cost-sharing.81 However, these testing coverage provisions are not 
comprehensive: they do not guarantee access to free COVID-19 testing 
for the uninsured, and they have limitations which in practice mean 
that some people with insurance coverage are still on the hook for 
testing-related out-of-pocket costs.82 
The actions to cover the cost of medical care associated with 
COVID-19 have been much more limited. A number of private insur-
ance companies have also pledged to voluntarily waive cost-sharing 
for COVID-19 medical care.83 However, their specific policies vary, and 
there are loopholes and exceptions that substantially limit the circum-
stances in which these pledges apply.84 Some states also expanded 
health insurance coverage through reopening enrollment on the Af-
fordable Care Act (ACA) insurance exchanges.85 Twelve states and DC 
run their own exchanges through separate state websites, whereas 
the other 38 states rely on the federal exchange platform. All but one 
 
 81. CARES Act, §§ 3203, 3713. 
 82. See Nisha Kurani, Karen Pollitz, Dustin Cotliar, Nicolas Scanosky, & Cynthia 
Cox, COVID-19 Test Prices and Payment Policy, Peterson-KFF Health System Tracker (Jul. 
15, 2020), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/covid-19-test-prices-and 
-payment-policy/ [https://perma.cc/5PEF-UK5P]. See also Sarah Kliff, Coronavirus 
Tests Are Supposed to Be Free. The Surprise Bills Come Anyway., N.Y. TIMES UPSHOT (Sept. 
9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/upshot/coronavirus-surprise-test 
-fees.html [https://perma.cc/8LFY-X6LF ] (“About 2.4 percent of coronavirus tests 
billed to insurers leave the patient responsible for some portion of payment, according 
to the health data firm Castlight. With 77 million tests performed so far, it could add 
up to hundreds of thousands of Americans who receive unexpected bills.”). 
 83. AMERICA’S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS (AHIP), Health Insurance Providers Re-
spond to Coronavirus (COVID-19) (May 29, 2020), https://www.ahip.org/health 
-insurance-providers-respond-to-coronavirus-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/2DBU 
-8Y9G]. 
 84. See, e.g., Reed Abelson, Now That Coronavirus Tests are Free, Some Insurers Are 
Waiving Costs for Treatment, N.Y. TIMES (March 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/03/19/health/coronavirus-tests-bills.html [https://perma.cc/Q9ZA-83LV] 
(“[A] lot of fine print remains: Some of the insurers have waived cost sharing for the 
next two months, while others are eliminating out-of-pocket expenses only for hospital 
stays. Many require people to go to hospitals and doctors within their plans. Another 
big caveat: The companies’ decisions also do not apply to the health plans they admin-
ister for employers that self-insure. Each of those companies will have to decide 
whether they will follow the insurers’ lead.”).  
 85. See State COVID-19 Health Policy Actions, Tbl. On Marketplace Special Enroll-
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of the states that run their own exchanges reopened enrollment in the 
spring, making it easier for people in those states to sign up for health 
insurance during the current pandemic.86 Several of these state ex-
changes reported thousands of newly enrolled individuals soon after 
they reopened enrollment.87 
However, the Trump Administration declined to reopen enroll-
ment in the other 38 states, despite pressure from Congress and the 
health care industry for them to do so.88 According to one estimate, 
doing so for 60 days would have served to enroll 440,000 to 640,000 
Americans.89 In addition, as of January 2020, 14 states had not yet ex-
panded their Medicaid programs under the ACA (which provides that 
the federal government will cover most of the cost of expanding Med-
icaid coverage to low-income adults), leaving over 2 million Ameri-
cans without access to health insurance before the pandemic.90 This 
number has likely risen significantly, as early estimates suggest that 
millions of Americans have lost—or will lose—access to insurance 
due to job losses caused by the pandemic.91 
 
 86. Margot Sanger-Katz & Reed Abelson, Eleven States Now Letting Uninsured Sign 
Up for Obamacare, N.Y. TIMES UPSHOT (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/03/23/upshot/coronavirus-obamacare-marketplaces-reopen.html [https:// 
perma.cc/Y3G9-ZHSF].  
 87. Rachel Schwab, Justin Giovannelli, & Kevin Lucia, During the COVID-19 Crisis, 
State Health Insurance Marketplaces Are Working to Enroll the Uninsured, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 19, 2020), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/ 
2020/during-covid-19-crisis-state-health-insurance-marketplaces-are-working 
-enroll-uninsured [https://perma.cc/DS6B-8MAJ]. 
 88. Margot Sanger-Katz & Reed Abelson, Obamacare Markets Will Not Reopen, 
Trump Decides, N.Y. TIMES UPSHOT (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
04/01/upshot/obamacare-markets-coronavirus-trump.html [https://perma.cc/ 
7NL6-T824].  
 89. Emily Gee, Charles Gaba, & Nicole Rapfogel, The ACA Marketplaces Are Poised 
To Weather COVID-19, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www 
.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2020/08/21/489710/aca 
-marketplaces-poised-weather-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/7T2C-4UKU]. 
 90. Rachel Garfield, Kendal Orgera, & Anthony Damico, The Coverage Gap: Unin-
sured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand Medicaid, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 14, 
2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor 
-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid/ [https://perma.cc/FQQ8-RA27].  
 91. Jessica Banthin, Michael Simpson, Matthew Buettgens, Linda J. Blumberg, & 
Robin Wang, Changes in Health Insurance Coverage Due to the COVID-19 Recession: Pre-
liminary Estimates Using Microsimulation, URBAN INST. (2020), https://www.urban 
.org/sites/default/files/publication/102552/changes-in-health-insurance-coverage 
-due-to-the-covid-19-recession_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/E54R-SF8A] (estimating that 
the number of uninsured will rise by 2.9 million people in 2020); Stan Dorn, The 
COVID-19 Pandemic and Resulting Economic Crash Have Caused the Greatest Health In-
surance Losses in American History, FAMILIES USA (Jul. 17, 2020), 
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Finally, federal and state policymakers have also waived various 
regulatory requirements to promote access to telehealth during the 
pandemic.92 HHS has waived various restrictions on Medicare cover-
age of telehealth services (including allowing beneficiaries to access 
telehealth from their home and allowing providers to evaluate pa-
tients who only have telephones), almost all states have expanded 
Medicaid coverage of telehealth services, and some states have also 
required so-called “payment parity” for telehealth (meaning that tele-
medicine services must be reimbursed at the same rate as equivalent 
in-person services).93 States have temporarily waived licensing re-
strictions and provider screening requirements to allow out-of-state 
providers with equivalent licensing.94 A number of private insurance 
companies have also voluntarily expanded their coverage of tele-
health services.95 
2.  Providers 
The CARES Act—together with a subsequent measure, the 
Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act—
provided a total of $175 billion in funding for hospitals and other 
health care entities, which have suffered steep revenue losses due to 





-G9Z8] (estimating that 5.4 million workers became uninsured because of job losses 
they experienced between February and May 2020); Rachel Garfield, Gary Claxton, An-
thony Damico, & Larry Levitt, Eligibility for ACA Health Coverage Following Job Loss, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (May 13, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/ 
issue-brief/eligibility-for-aca-health-coverage-following-job-loss/ [https://perma.cc/ 
HX9N-V8C4] (estimating that “as of May 2nd, 2020, nearly 27 million people could po-
tentially lose ESI [employer-sponsored insurance] and become uninsured following 
job loss. . . .”). 
 92. See Gabriela Weigel, Amrutha Ramaswamy, Laurie Sobel, Alina Salganicoff, Ju-
liette Cubanski, & Meredith Freed, Opportunities and Barriers for Telemedicine in the 




 93. Id.  
 94. Id. See also Medicaid Emergency Authority Tracker: Approved State Actions to 
Address COVID-19, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (May 29, 2020), https://www.kff.org/ 
coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/medicaid-emergency-authority-tracker-approved 
-state-actions-to-address-covid-19/#Table1 [https://perma.cc/6HMW-9M7A].  
 95. See Weigel et al., supra note 92. 
 96. Bob Herman, Health Care Bailout Fund Reaches $175 Billion, AXIOS (Apr. 22, 
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methodology HHS used to allocate the funding, a disproportionate 
share of it has gone to larger, wealthier institutions, rather than those 
hospitals with the greatest financial need or the largest COVID-19 bur-
den.97 In addition, HHS has distributed less funding to communities 
with relatively higher Black populations than is warranted based on 
the health or financial impacts of COVID-19, further exacerbating the 
unequal effects that the pandemic has had on communities of color.98 
3.  States 
To help defray the costs of rising Medicaid enrollment and pre-
vent states from cutting benefits, the Families First Act temporarily 
increases the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for state 
and territorial Medicaid programs by 6.2 percentage points until the 
end of the public health emergency.99 The Medicaid program is jointly 
financed by the federal government and the states. The federal gov-
ernment’s share of Medicaid spending—which is determined by the 
FMAP—is based on states’ per capita income and ranges from 50 to 
78 percent in FY 2021.100 
States have to meet several conditions to be eligible for the in-
creased matching funds, including covering testing and treatments for 
COVID-19 without imposing any cost-sharing, and not imposing more 




 97. See Karyn Schwartz & Anthony Damico, Distribution of CARES Act Funding 
Among Hospitals, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (May 13, 2020), https://www.kff.org/health 
-costs/issue-brief/distribution-of-cares-act-funding-among-hospitals/ [https:// 
perma.cc/ZN7Z-T2W7]; Jesse Drucker, Jessica Silver-Greenberg, & Sarah Kliff, Wealth-
iest Hospitals Got Billions in Bailout for Struggling Health Providers, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/25/business/coronavirus-hospitals 
-bailout.html [https://perma.cc/H7AN-H2VG]; Jay Hancock, Phil Galewitz, & Elizabeth 
Lucas, Furor Erupts: Billions Going to Hospitals Based on Medicare Billings, Not COVID-
19, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 10, 2020), https://khn.org/news/furor-erupts-billions 
-going-to-hospitals-based-on-medicare-billings-not-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/ 
RN8N-KRSK].  
 98. See Pragya Kakani, Amitabh Chandra, Sendhil Mullainathan, & Ziad Ober-
meyer, Allocation of COVID-19 Relief Funding to Disproportionately Black Counties, 324 
JAMA 1000 (2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/ 
2769419#:~:text=Disproportionately%20Black%20counties%20(29.6%25%20 
Black,%2B0.50%20SD%2C%20P%20%3C%20. [https://perma.cc/ZAH4-MTPR]. 
 99. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, § 6008. 
 100. MaryBeth Musumeci, Key Questions About the New Increase in Federal Medi-
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premiums, or involuntarily disenrolling beneficiaries who were en-
rolled as of March 18, 2020 or after through the end of the public 
health emergency.101 The increased FMAP does not apply to adminis-
trative expenses or to most Medicaid spending that is already subject 
to a higher match, including the ACA’s Medicaid expansion popula-
tion.102 
C. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND OTHER JOB-RELATED ASSISTANCE  
Although not specifically targeting low-income individuals, the 
Families First and CARES Acts expanded job-loss and paid leave pro-
tections during the pandemic, providing vital support to low-income 
households.  
Starting with direct support, the CARES Act temporarily ex-
panded federal unemployment insurance (UI) benefits for those who 
lost their jobs due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The expansion provided 
an additional federally funded $600 per week payment through July 
31, 2020.103 The federal law also encouraged states to provide benefits 
to workers who have lost hours, even if they retain some employment, 
by covering some or all of such payments through December 31, 
2020.104 This incentive should help workers in the approximately 20 
states that do not provide unemployment support to workers who 
lose hours.105 To support “gig workers” and other non-employee 
workers who would otherwise be excluded from UI programs, the 
CARES Act provided a set amount of federally funded unemployment 
compensation for self-employed workers through the end of 2020.106 
The rapid enactment, breadth, and complexity of the UI expansions led 
to rollout problems, with many applicants unable to complete the bur-
densome application process and others experiencing long delays in 
 
 101. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, § 6008. In late October 2020, the 
Trump Administration issued an interim final rule that would weaken this “continuous 
coverage” protection for Medicaid beneficiaries. 42 C.F.R. §433.400. See Edwin Park, 
New CMS Rule Would Weaken Families First Continuous Coverage Protection in Medi-
caid, GEO. UNIV. HEALTH POL’Y INST. CTR. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (Nov. 2, 2020), 
https://ccf.georgetown.edu/2020/11/02/new-cms-rule-would-weaken-families 
-first-continuous-coverage-protection-in-medicaid/ [https://perma.cc/GUH3-G7LG]. 
 102. Musumeci, supra note 100. 
 103. CARES Act § 2104. 
 104. CARES Act §§ 2108, 2109. 
 105. Id.  
 106. CARES Act § 2102; U.S. Dept. Of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Program 
Letter No. 16-20 (Apr. 5, 2020), https://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/UIPL/UIPL_ 
16-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV7N-YLGT] (providing guidance on the Pandemic Un-
employment Assistance (PUA) Program to state unemployment agencies). 
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receiving benefits.107  
The July 31st expiration of the $600 supplemental unemploy-
ment benefit came just as states faced mid-summer virus surges, leav-
ing many unemployed individuals unable to pay their bills.108 Rein-
stating the supplement was a major sticking point in Congressional 
negotiations over subsequent response bills. The Trump Administra-
tion again undertook unilateral action, authorizing FEMA to provide 
states with an additional $300 per week for unemployed individu-
als.109 The application process was complex, and the amount of fund-
ing authorized—$44 billion—provided additional support for only six 
weeks.110 Researchers have found that the poverty rate increased 
from May to September following the expiration of the CARES Act’s 
stimulus checks and supplemental unemployment benefit.111 
In addition to expanded unemployment benefits, the CARES Act 
enacted several programs designed to incentivize employers to main-
tain their existing workforces. One was a forgivable loan administered 
through the Small Business Administration, called the Paycheck Pro-
tection Program (PPP).112 Businesses with up to 500 employees were 
able to apply for up to $10 million.113 The program ended in early Au-
gust 2020, after more than 5.1 million businesses received support, 
but with $1.26 billion still left undistributed.114 Recipients can apply 
 
 107. Zipperer & Gould, supra note 34; Long et al., supra note 34; Patricia Cohen & 
Tiffany Hsu, ‘Sudden Black Hole’ for the Economy with Millions More Unemployed, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/business/economy/ 
unemployment-claim-numbers-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/GP5K-FS93]. 
 108. Ben Casselman, End of $600 Unemployment Bonus Could Push Millions Past the 
Brink, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/business/ 
economy/coronavirus-unemployment-benefits.html [https://perma.cc/H3FC-GKZD]. 
 109. Memorandum from the White House to the Sec’y of Labor, Sec’y of Homeland 




 110. Ron Lieber & Stacy Cowley, Trump’s Directives Were Supposed to Offer Relief. 
Most May Not., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/09/ 
business/trump-executive-orders-unemployment.html [https://perma.cc/DX6V 
-JUSW]; Jeff Stein & Eli Rosenberg, Trump’s $300 Unemployment Funding is Already 
Running Out, Leaving Millions in Crisis Again, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2020), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/09/11/lost-wages-unemployment 
-assistance-expiring/ [https://perma.cc/3DV9-HHHJ]. 
 111. See Parolin et al., supra note 39. 
 112. CARES Act, § 1102. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Sarah D. Wire, A Revamped PPP Coronavirus Loan Program Is in the Works. 
Will It Help Small Businesses Left out Before?, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2020), https:// 
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for the loan to be forgiven, provided that at least 75 percent of the loan 
proceeds were used for payroll costs, among other eligibility require-
ments.115 The second employment incentive is a tax credit equal to 50 
percent of qualified wages up to $10,000 per employee per calendar 
quarter.116 These two workforce incentives are mutually exclusive—
that is, employers can only receive one. 
Serious inequities have plagued the distribution of PPP loans, 
with significant funds going to large businesses like global hotel and 
restaurant chains (which qualify because a single location is deemed 
a “small business”).117 Several large companies returned funds in the 
wake of public disapprobation.118 Additionally, by delivering funds 
through commercial banks, distribution of PPP loans reflected exist-
ing race-related lending gaps.119 There is growing evidence that Black 
business owners had a more difficult time securing funding.120 A sec-
ond wave of PPP funding, if approved by Congress, may address some 
of these concerns.121   
In addition to job-loss support, the Families First Act expanded 
paid leave protections for employees, requiring certain employers to 
provide two weeks of paid sick leave at full pay if an employee is sick 
or quarantined due to COVID-19 and up to twelve weeks of paid leave 
at two-thirds of the employee’s regular pay to care for a child whose 





 115. CARES Act §§ 1102, 1106. 
 116. CARES Act § 2301. 
 117. Danielle Kurtzleben, Jim Zarroli, Laura Sullivan, Cheryl W. Thompson, Bill 
Chappell, Graham Smith, & Pallavi Gogoi, Here’s How the Small Business Loan Program 
Went Wrong in Just 4 Weeks, NPR (May 4, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/04/ 
848389343/how-did-the-small-business-loan-program-have-so-many-problems-in 
-just-4-weeks [https://perma.cc/G6HY-9SEC]. 
 118. Thomas Franck, Companies Returned $30 Billion in Small-Business Loans from 
Paycheck Protection Program, CNBC (Jul. 6, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/ 
06/companies-returned-30-billion-in-small-business-loans-from-ppp.html [https:// 
perma.cc/Z9BH-6BWT]. 
 119. Kramer Mills & Battisto, supra note 36, at 6. 
 120. Emily Flitter, Black Business Owners Had a Harder Time Getting Federal Aid, a 
Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/15/ 
business/paycheck-protection-program-bias.html [https://perma.cc/V3X8-QTSS]. 
 121. Wire, supra note 114. 
 122. See Families First Coronavirus Response Act: Employee Paid Leave Rights, DEP’T 
OF LABOR (Mar. 2020), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/pandemic/ffcra 
-employee-paid-leave [https://perma.cc/5LY3-5J3D]. Note that employees that have 
been employed for less than 30 days are only eligible for two weeks of paid leave to 
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provisions, which expire in December 2020, apply to certain public 
employers and private employers with fewer than 500 employees.123 
They do not cover independent contractors or most “gig workers.”124 
  III.  BUILDING ON THE PANDEMIC RESPONSE: SUSTAINED 
SUPPORT FOR LOW-INCOME AMERICANS   
Whether the COVID-19 crisis lasts months or years, the initial bi-
partisan support for significant increases in spending on social wel-
fare programs will abate. Members of Congress and policymakers at 
all levels of government will be confronted with the choices of which 
temporary changes should be made permanent, either through statute 
or by rule. This Part begins by looking at which time-limited measures 
should be extended beyond the current crisis or augmented. It con-
cludes by discussing what anti-poverty proposals policymakers 
should consider that go beyond improving existing programs. 
A. WHICH PANDEMIC POLICY CHANGES TO EXTEND OR AUGMENT 
This Section identifies how Congress and federal agencies should 
build on the pandemic response by making some of the temporary 
policy changes permanent and further strengthening these safety net 
programs. We proceed with a focus on food assistance, medical assis-
tance, unemployment insurance, and paid leave. 
  
1.  Food Assistance 
Currently, SNAP monthly benefits do not cover a family’s food 
budget. Households redeem 80 percent of SNAP benefits within just 
two weeks of receiving them.125 Congress should increase maximum 
SNAP benefits by 15 percent, just as it did in response to the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis. That increase has been shown to have had a powerful 
impact, not just for families, but for the national economy.126 Congress 
 
care for a child whose school or daycare has closed. Id. 
 123. Id. Small businesses with fewer than 50 employees can apply for an exemp-
tion from the extended family leave requirements. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Jared Bernstein & Ben Spielberg, Preparing for the Next Recession: Lessons 
from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 
(2016), https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/preparing-for-the-next-recession 
-lessons-from-the-american-recovery-and [https://perma.cc/9SU6-WRDL]. 
 126. Alan S. Blinder & Mark Zandi, The Financial Crisis: Lessons for the Next One, 
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (2015), https://www.cbpp.org/research/ 
economy/the-financial-crisis-lessons-for-the-next-one [https://perma.cc/L3WP 
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should also go beyond merely pausing the Trump Administration’s al-
ready-enjoined SNAP time limit for ABAWD recipients. Congress 
should repeal the ABAWD provision.127 Congress should also suspend 
the implementation of the proposed categorical eligibility and utility 
calculation rules.128 Congress should also extend the timeframe for the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture to spend down the emergency appro-
priations for the WIC and TEFAP nutrition programs. If either appro-
priation is exhausted, Congress should consider an additional appro-
priation for another six-month period. Congress should also extend 
the Pandemic EBT program through FY 2021 so children who experi-
ence school closures later this school year do not go without meals. 
When COVID-19 hit, many Americans began ordering their gro-
ceries online for the first time (and continue to do so).129 The over 
forty million Americans who purchase food using SNAP could not.130 
Congress should allow SNAP recipients to purchase groceries 
online.131 The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) recently launched an 
online purchasing pilot. Forty-four states and DC are currently partic-
ipating.132 FNS should promulgate a rule that permits SNAP recipients 
to make purchases online until Congress can make that change legis-
latively, perhaps in the next Farm Bill. 
2.  Medical Assistance 
Congress should provide additional FMAP increases beyond the 
 
-HQSG]. 
 127. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (2015). 
 128. See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.  
 129. Nathaniel Popper, Americans Keep Clicking to Buy, Minting New Online Shop-
ping Winners, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2020/05/13/technology/online-shopping-buying-sales-coronavirus.html [https:// 
perma.cc/85ES-HAKV] (reporting data from “several surveys [that] more than a third 
of all Americans have ordered groceries online for the first time over the last month, 
and people have spent more ordering groceries online each succeeding week of the 
crisis.”). 
 130. Retailer Requirements to Provide Online Purchasing to SNAP Households, FOOD 
& NUTRIT. SERV. (May 6, 2020), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/retailer-requirements 
-provide-online-purchasing [https://perma.cc/3NJJ-J87K]. 
 131. Abigail Abrams, Mothers Who Rely on Federal Food Aid Struggle to Get Grocer-
ies Safely During the COVID-19 Outbreak, TIME (June 1, 2020), https://time.com/ 
5844953/wic-online-groceries-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/NEW5-A8FM]. 
 132. FNS Launches the Online Purchasing Pilot, FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV. (last updated 
Dec. 2, 2020) https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/online-purchasing-pilot [https:// 
perma.cc/E8FS-Y5S7]. Notably, Amazon and Wal-Mart, are by far the most common 
participants across the pilot states. See id. 
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6.2 percentage point increase in the Families First Act.133 As it stands, 
the Families First FMAP increase is insufficient to offset the state 
budget shortfalls that would result from even a 1 percentage point in-
crease in unemployment.134 Notably, the Families First FMAP increase 
is smaller than the increase that Congress authorized in the 2009 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA),135 despite the fact 
that increases in Medicaid enrollment are likely to be greater during 
the current pandemic than they were during the Great Recession, and 
state budget deficits are likely to be more severe.136 Congress should 
also extend the FMAP increase—along with the associated eligibility 
requirements for states—beyond the end of the public health emer-
gency, since the economic crisis caused by the pandemic seems likely 
to outlast the pandemic itself, and should increase the Medicaid ex-
pansion federal match to 100 percent to encourage more states to ex-
pand their Medicaid programs.137 
The temporary changes in the regulations and reimbursement 
rules governing telehealth have the potential to improve access to 
health care (especially for people with chronic conditions or those 
who live far from health care centers),138 but have also raised 
 
 133. Sharon Parrott, Aviva Aron-Dine, Michael Leachman, Chad Stone, Dorothy 
Rosenbaum, LaDonna Pavetti, Peggy Bailey, Chuck Marr, & Kathleen Romig, Immediate 
and Robust Policy Response Needed in Face of Grave Risks to the Economy, CTR. BUDGET 
& POL’Y PRIORITIES 1, 5–6 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/ 
atoms/files/3-19-20econ.pdf [https://perma.cc/YH7D-8QNR]. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Edwin Park, Critical Need for Further, Large FMAP Increases to Sustain State 
Medicaid Programs During Economic Crisis, GEO. UNIV. HEALTH POL’Y INST. CTR. FOR 
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (May 4, 2020), https://ccf.georgetown.edu/2020/05/04/ 
critical-need-for-further-large-fmap-increases-to-sustain-state-medicaid-programs 
-during-economic-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/9FD2-KNNJ] (explaining that although 
ARRA also authorized a minimum FMAP increase of 6.2 percentage points, it also in-
cluded a “hold harmless” provision that prevented scheduled FMAP reductions and 
provided for additional FMAP increases based on state unemployment rates—so that 
the resulting total FMAP increases ranged from 6.94 to 13.87 percentage points). See 
also ALISON MITCHELL, CONG. RES. SERV., R46346 MEDICAID RECESSION-RELATED FMAP 
INCREASES (2020) (explaining the similarities and differences among FMAP increases 
in response to the 2001 recession, the 2007–2009 recession, and the 2020 pandemic).  
 136. Id. 
 137. See Nicole Huberfeld, Sarah H. Gordon, & David K. Jones, Federalism Compli-
cates the Response to the COVID-19 Health and Economic Crisis: What Can Be Done?, 45 
J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 11–12 (forthcoming 2020); Parrott et al., supra note 133, at 
5–6.  
 138. See Gabriel Scheffler, Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach 
to Reforming Occupational Licensing, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 293, 315–16 (2019). 
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concerns about fraud, privacy, and quality of care.139 Some of the re-
cent changes, such as the loosening of licensing restrictions to enable 
out-of-state health care providers to deliver health care in-state with-
out obtaining a separate state license, should be made permanent in 
our view.140 But others, such as payment parity, have more complex 
trade-offs and will require further study and analysis.141  
3.  Unemployment Insurance  
Even before the pandemic, the need to reform and update UI sys-
tems was clear. Over the last fifteen years, UI has covered a smaller 
and smaller slice of the U.S. labor force as states have tightened eligi-
bility requirements and reduced the duration of benefits.142 States 
have also severely underfunded their UI trust funds, and no state suf-
ficiently assists UI recipients in searching for a new job.143 Indeed, 
many of the UI provisions in the CARES Act can be traced to reformers’ 
pre-COVID wish lists.144 Rather than returning to the old, flawed sys-
tem once the crisis is over, recent reforms offer an opportunity to per-
manently improve UI and make it work for today’s economy.   
Since the 2008 recession, “nontraditional” jobs have dominated 
job-growth figures, reflecting economy-wide shifts toward part-time, 
 
 139. See Carmel Schachar, Jaclyn Engel, & Glyn Elwyn, Implications for Telehealth 
in a Postpandemic Future: Regulatory and Privacy Issues, 323 JAMA 2375, 2376 (May 
18, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2766369 
[https://perma.cc/8H3F-8HDB]; Fred Schulte, Coronavirus Fuels Explosive Growth in 
Telehealth – And Concern About Fraud, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 22, 2020), https:// 
khn.org/news/coronavirus-fuels-explosive-growth-in-telehealth-%E2%80%95-and 
-concern-about-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/78NU-SGGH].  
 140. See Alexa Richardson, Medical Licensure Law Suspensions During COVID-19 
Present Opportunity for Change, HARV. L. SCH. PETRIE-FLOM CTR.: BILL OF HEALTH (Apr. 23, 
2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/04/23/medical-licensure 
-laws-covid19/ [https://perma.cc/W84B-UKMH]. See also Robert Kocher, Topher 
Spiro, Emily Oshima Lee, Gabriel Scheffler, Stephen Shortell, David Cutler, & Ezekiel 
Emanuel, Doctors Without State Borders: Physicians Practicing Across State Lines, 
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 18, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/18/ 
doctors-without-state-borders-practicing-across-state-lines [https://perma.cc/8UMG 
-4VUS].  
 141. See Schachar, Engel, & Elwyn, supra note 139, at 2376. 
 142. See, e.g., Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, The Economic 
Case for Strengthening Unemployment Insurance, at the Center for American Progress, 
Washington, D.C. 9 (July 11, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ 
default/files/page/files/20160711_furman_uireform_cea.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Z7YK-L3RS]. 
 143. Id. at 10–11. 
 144. Id.  
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temporary, and nonemployee worker relationships.145 Unemploy-
ment insurance systems have left many of these workers without pro-
tection, undermining the systems’ ability to act as a safety net during 
recessions. The CARES Act expands coverage for freelance and self-
employed workers, as well as workers who lose hours while retaining 
their jobs. These expansions should be made permanent. If funding is 
a concern, states or the federal government can increase the base 
wage to which UI applies, which is currently $7,000 and is not indexed 
for inflation, leaving room for upward growth.146 
4.  Paid Leave 
As with unemployment insurance, the reforms to paid leave pol-
icies made in response to the pandemic have been sorely needed147 
and should be extended beyond the current crisis. Low-wage workers 
should not be forced to choose between paying their bills and caring 
for themselves and their children.148 Moreover, incentivizing people 
to work when they are sick spreads infection and puts others at 
risk.149 Congress should make permanent the paid leave mandates in 
the Families First Act, and should expand the mandate to cover more 
types of employers.150 
B. THE SAFETY NET AFTER THE PANDEMIC: THE LONG VIEW  
One limitation of crisis-induced social policy is that legislators 
prioritize policies that can be implemented quickly over policies that 
 
 145. Id. at 4. 
 146. Id. at 10 (proposing the same). 
 147. Elise Gould, Rich People Have Paid Sick Days. Poor People Do Not., ECON. POL’Y 
INST. (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/rich-people-have-paid-sick 
-days-poor-people-do-not/ [https://perma.cc/L4TC-A83Y]. 
 148. Lisa Clemens-Cope, Cynthia D. Perry, Genevieve M. Kenney, Jennifer E. Pelle-
tier, & Matthew S. Pantell, Access to and Use of Paid Sick Leave Among Low-Income Fam-
ilies with Children, 122 PEDIATRICS e480 (2008). 
 149. Supriya Kumar, The Impact of Workplace Policies and Other Social Factors on 
Self-Reported Influenza-Like Illness Incidence During the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic, 102 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH e1 (2011), https://www.cdc.gov/cpr/documents/science/AJPH_ 
2011_300307v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ7H-2PFU] (estimating that an additional 5 
million people contracted the H1N1 influenza virus during the 2009 pandemic due to 
inadequate workplace protections such as the absence of paid sick leave); Diana 
Boesch, Sarah Jane Glynn, & Shilpa Phadke, Lack of Paid Leave Risks Public Health Dur-
ing the Coronavirus Outbreak, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www 
.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2020/03/12/481609/lack-paid-leave 
-risks-public-health-coronavirus-outbreak/ [https://perma.cc/66FQ-KTKQ]. 
 150. For a comprehensive proposal, see Deborah Widiss, Equalizing Parental 
Leave, 105 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
 
182 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [105:154 
 
might be better across other dimensions. Yet urgency does not obviate 
the need for transformational change. Congress and the Biden admin-
istration should seize this unique moment to consider how to trans-
form our safety net into one that meaningfully supports all Americans.  
This Section suggests some changes that are not animated strictly 
by a desire for rapid relief to low-income Americans. In particular, we 
recommend policies that begin to dismantle the racism embedded in 
American social policy151 and that reject the insensitive and unrealis-
tic demands of work-based social benefits.  
1. The United States Needs Universal Health Insurance Coverage 
The pandemic has underscored the necessity of having a health 
insurance program that is both affordable and open to everyone. It has 
also underscored the precarious nature of employer-based health in-
surance coverage: because of this system, millions of Americans will 
lose their health insurance coverage just at a time when they are es-
pecially financially vulnerable.152 Although some people who lose cov-
erage during the pandemic may be eligible for coverage through Med-
icaid or for subsidized coverage on the ACA exchanges, many others 
will have no affordable option to obtain health insurance.153 Moreo-
ver, even those who have insurance coverage may be unable to pay 
the out-of-pocket costs associated with COVID-19 treatment and may 
decide as a result to risk not seeking medical care, thereby endanger-
ing their own health.154 
President-elect Biden has proposed a plan that would lower the 
Medicare eligibility age to 60, expand the subsidies on the ACA ex-
changes, and create a new public option that would compete with 
 
 151. For a discussion of how applying an anti-racism perspective would change 
progressive policy proposals, see IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTI-RACIST 21–23 
(2019). For a related inquiry into how a focus on how people experience public bene-
fits programs could change law and policy, see Monica Bell, Stephanie Garlock, & Alex-
ander Nabavi-Noori, Toward a Demosprudence of Poverty, 69 DUKE L.J. 1473 (2020). 
 152. Ezra Klein, It’s Time to Move Past Employer-Based Health Insurance, VOX (Apr. 
9, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/9/21210353/coronavirus-health-insurance 
-biden-sanders-medicare-for-all [https://perma.cc/72DK-6UA6]. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See generally Zarek C. Brot-Goldberg, Amitabh Chandra, Benjamin R. Handel, 
& Jonathan T. Kolstad, What Does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health 
Care Prices, Quantities, and Spending Dynamics, 132 QUART. J. ECON. 1261 (2017) (find-
ing that a switch to high-deductible plans caused enrollees to reduce health care 
spending across the board, including on both potentially valuable and potentially 
wasteful care). 
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private insurers.155 Congressional Democrats have also introduced a 
number of bills that would expand the government’s role in providing 
health insurance, ranging from Medicare-for-All to “public option” 
proposals.156 Other recent bills would provide for a temporary cover-
age expansion during the pandemic, using either Medicare or Medi-
caid to cover the costs of COVID-19-related treatment and testing.157  
2.  Federal Policymakers Should Streamline Medicaid, SNAP, and UI 
According to the Congressional Budget Office, SNAP, Medicaid, 
and UI provide the majority of the federal government’s automatic 
stabilization spending.158 Yet, more should be done to enhance how 
these programs respond to future crises. SNAP has uniform benefit 
levels, but the federal government could do more to streamline other 
features of the program, like joint processing with Medicaid, simpli-
fied reporting, and longer certification periods for the elderly and peo-
ple with disabilities.159 Likewise, policymakers should do more to pro-
mote enrollment in Medicaid and subsidized private coverage on the 
ACA exchanges, for instance by broadening the use of presumptive el-
igibility and streamlining coverage enrollment with UI processes.160 
 
 155. Health Care, JOE BIDEN FOR PRESIDENT, https://joebiden.com/healthcare/ 
[https://perma.cc/F7ZQ-V6BT]; Joe Biden, Joe Biden Outlines New Steps to Ease Eco-
nomic Burden on Working People, https://medium.com/@JoeBiden/joe-biden-out-
lines-new-steps-to-ease-economic-burden-on-working-people-e3e121037322 
[https://perma.cc/K4YL-FDBA].  
 156. Compare Medicare-for-all and Public Plan Proposals, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 
(May 15, 2019), https://www.kff.org/interactive/compare-medicare-for-all-public 
-plan-proposals/ [https://perma.cc/GN6M-ASBE].  
 157. Health Care Emergency Guarantee Act, H.R. 6906 116th Cong. (2020); Emer-
gency Medicaid for Coronavirus Treatment Act H.R. 6462 116th Cong. (2020). 
 158. Frank Russek & Kim Kowalewski, How CBO Estimates Automatic Stabilizers: 
Working Paper 2015-07, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE. Automatic stabilization refers to in-
creased government spending during an economic downturn that does not require 
new legislation or regulations. 
 159. For some promising proposals, see Hilary Hoynes & Diane Whitmore Schan-
zenbach, Policies to Strengthen Our Nation’s Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Pro-
gram, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Feb. 18, 2020), https://equitablegrowth 
.org/policies-to-strengthen-our-nations-supplemental-nutrition-assistance 
-program/ [https://perma.cc/D5CE-GHFW]. See also State Options Report, FOOD & 
NUTRIT. SERV. (14th ed.) (May 2018), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/ 
files/snap/14-State-Options.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VD2-NFMM]. 
 160. See Christen Linke Young & Sobin Lee, Making ACA Enrollment More Auto-
matic for the Newly Unemployed, USC-BROOKINGS SCHAEFFER INITIATIVE FOR HEALTH POL’Y 
(May 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp|-content/uploads/2020/05/Young-and 
-Lee_May_2020-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/682L-E3FE]; Parrott et al., supra note 133, at 
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Congress should also extend SNAP and Medicaid to Americans who 
live in overseas territories so that their access to basic assistance does 
not turn on whether or not Congress will make an emergency appro-
priation every time there is a national crisis.161 
The pandemic has also highlighted the importance of adding au-
tomatic stabilizers to Medicaid, SNAP, and UI.162 Each of these three 
programs are countercyclical, meaning that enrollment tends to in-
crease when the economy weakens, and to decrease when the econ-
omy grows stronger.163 This presents budgetary challenges for states 
during economic downturns, since their spending on Medicaid and UI 
tends to increase just as their tax revenue decreases, and since they 
must balance their budgets annually.164 For Medicaid, states tend to 
respond by making eligibility requirements more stringent, reducing 
the scope of covered benefits, and reducing the amount that they pay 
providers—limiting essential health benefits to low-income groups 
when they are especially vulnerable.165 Instead of relying on Congress 
to increase FMAP or expand UI benefits every time the United States 
experiences an economic downturn, a better approach would be to au-
tomatically increase federal funding to Medicaid, CHIP, and UI pro-
grams any time a state’s unemployment rate exceeds a threshold 
level.166 This approach would protect vulnerable populations during 
economic crises by preventing states from making harmful cuts, and 
would be administratively simpler and faster. 167 Congress could sim-
ilarly improve SNAP’s ability to serve as an automatic stabilizer by in-
creasing the maximum benefit by 15 percent whenever the national 
unemployment rate triggers the Sahm recession indicator.168 Enacting 
 
 161. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.  
 162. See Matthew Fiedler, States Are Being Crushed by the Coronavirus. Only This 
Can Help., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/ 
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INCREASES (2020). 
 164. Matthew Fiedler, Jason Furman, & Wilson Powell III, Increasing Federal Sup-
port for State Medicaid and CHIP Programs in Response to Economic Downturns, 
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(May 18, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/5/18/ 
21246421/congress-stimulus-ideas [https://perma.cc/PNT8-P9PF]. 
 167. Id. 
 168. For such a proposal, see Hilary Hoynes & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, 
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such automatic expansions would enable federal and state agencies to 
act more quickly, with greater certainty of federal support for ex-
panded benefits in times of need. Furthermore, Congress should pro-
tect SNAP from inadequate funding or a government shutdown by 
making two changes in its appropriations process. Congress should 
fund SNAP via an advance appropriation and include a provision that 
provides “such sums as may be necessary” to fulfill federal law.169 
3.  Congress Should Legislate a Permanent Child Allowance 
The CARES Act recovery rebate check, by providing a $500 pay-
ment for each child, suggests what a Universal Child Allowance might 
look like. A child allowance is similar in concept to a universal basic 
income170 but provided to children only (or, more accurately, their 
parents or guardians). Congress and the Biden administration should 
seriously consider enacting such a policy, which has been proposed 
time and again by policymakers and experts.171  
Currently, low-income families may receive cash support via re-
fundable tax credits, specifically, the earned income tax credit (EITC) 
and child tax credit,172 and some may be eligible for Temporary Aid to 
Needy Families (TANF) as well. For the most part, only working fami-
lies are eligible for these benefits.173 While the work-incentive 
 
Strengthening SNAP as an Automatic Stabilizer, BROOKINGS INST., https://www 
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2016). 
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structure is politically popular, the result is that the poorest families, 
those with unstable ties to the labor market, receive less support or 
none at all.174  
A child allowance would obviate these concerns by providing a 
flat benefit to all families with children, usually at a set amount per 
child. Such a structure would eliminate any concerns about work dis-
incentives and benefit gaps for the poorest families and would be ad-
ministratively much simpler than both means-tested and work-based 
programs. The benefit could be provided monthly or annually and, if 
large enough, could drastically reduce administrative costs by replac-
ing the EITC, child tax credit, and TANF. The benefit could phase out 
at higher income levels, similar to the recovery rebate, or be offset by 
a higher tax rate among higher-income households. 
4.  The United States Can No Longer Permit Racism to Serve as an 
Organizing Principle of its Safety Net 
Federal law has consistently embraced racism and xenophobia in 
its organization of social welfare programs. From the New Deal175 to 
the War on Poverty176 to Welfare Reform,177 American policymakers 
have repeatedly excluded African-Americans, indigenous Americans,  
Americans who live in overseas territories, and immigrants from the 
programs discussed in this Essay. Black Americans are routinely sin-
gled out as unworthy of government programs.178 Indigenous 
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Americans are poorly served by a chronically underfunded Indian 
Health Service and a commodity food distribution program that does 
not meet the needs of its tribal membership.179 Americans who live in 
Puerto Rico and the other territories may access nutrition and medical 
assistance, but the federal government provides less funding to the 
territories than it does to the states, including through a budgetary 
cap.180 And federal and state law renders lawfully present immigrants 
ineligible for SNAP, Medicaid, the EITC, and other benefits, even in 
some cases where these adults are raising citizen children.181 The 
Trump Administration’s immigration policies and its proposals for 
SNAP and Medicaid work requirements fit this pattern of earlier pol-
icy initiatives and even earlier tropes rooted in slavery and Jim 
Crow.182 This racism has been abetted by the devolved structure of 
many American social welfare programs permitting states to deny ac-
cess to members of racial and ethnic minorities.183 The three policies 
we propose above—universal health insurance, streamlining Medi-
caid, SNAP, and UI, and a child allowance—would make it more diffi-
cult for federal, state, and local administrators to discriminate against 
people of color by reducing discretion and differences in benefit levels 
and access. But we are not so naïve as to think that they would be suf-
ficient to root out the persistent racism in the American welfare state. 
Only from sustained mobilization and pressure on policymakers will 
those changes come. 
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  CONCLUSION   
This survey of federal anti-poverty initiatives amid the pandemic 
is not meant to be exhaustive.184 Any national effort to confront the 
calamities of COVID-19 cannot be limited to these programs. Nor can 
such an effort ignore them. While other proposals, like universal basic 
income, are worthy of consideration, they will necessarily require sus-
tained efforts by tenacious national coalitions to overcome the sub-
stantial barriers to creating new federal programs, especially in an era 
of divided government. That does not mean those proposals are not 
worth fighting for, but in the meantime, we should not neglect the pro-
grams discussed above—ones that comprise some of the largest ex-
penditures by the United States that benefit low-income Americans 
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